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+"""
+The `compat` module provides support for backwards compatibility with older
+versions of django/python, and compatbility wrappers around optional packages.
+"""
+# flake8: noqa
+import django
+
+# cStringIO only if it's available, otherwise StringIO
+try:
+ import cStringIO as StringIO
+except ImportError:
+ import StringIO
+
+
+def get_concrete_model(model_cls):
+ try:
+ return model_cls._meta.concrete_model
+ except AttributeError:
+ # 1.3 does not include concrete model
+ return model_cls
+
+
+# First implementation of Django class-based views did not include head method
+# in base View class - https://code.djangoproject.com/ticket/15668
+if django.VERSION >= (1, 4):
+ from django.views.generic import View
+else:
+ from django.views.generic import View as _View
+ from django.utils.decorators import classonlymethod
+ from django.utils.functional import update_wrapper
+
+ class View(_View):
+ @classonlymethod
+ def as_view(cls, **initkwargs):
+ """
+ Main entry point for a request-response process.
+ """
+ # sanitize keyword arguments
+ for key in initkwargs:
+ if key in cls.http_method_names:
+ raise TypeError(u"You tried to pass in the %s method name as a "
+ u"keyword argument to %s(). Don't do that."
+ % (key, cls.__name__))
+ if not hasattr(cls, key):
+ raise TypeError(u"%s() received an invalid keyword %r" % (
+ cls.__name__, key))
+
+ def view(request, *args, **kwargs):
+ self = cls(**initkwargs)
+ if hasattr(self, 'get') and not hasattr(self, 'head'):
+ self.head = self.get
+ return self.dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs)
+
+ # take name and docstring from class
+ update_wrapper(view, cls, updated=())
+
+ # and possible attributes set by decorators
+ # like csrf_exempt from dispatch
+ update_wrapper(view, cls.dispatch, assigned=())
+ return view
+
+# PUT, DELETE do not require CSRF until 1.4. They should. Make it better.
+if django.VERSION >= (1, 4):
+ from django.middleware.csrf import CsrfViewMiddleware
+else:
+ import hashlib
+ import re
+ import random
+ import logging
+ import urlparse
+
+ from django.conf import settings
+ from django.core.urlresolvers import get_callable
+
+ try:
+ from logging import NullHandler
+ except ImportError:
+ class NullHandler(logging.Handler):
+ def emit(self, record):
+ pass
+
+ logger = logging.getLogger('django.request')
+
+ if not logger.handlers:
+ logger.addHandler(NullHandler())
+
+ def same_origin(url1, url2):
+ """
+ Checks if two URLs are 'same-origin'
+ """
+ p1, p2 = urlparse.urlparse(url1), urlparse.urlparse(url2)
+ return p1[0:2] == p2[0:2]
+
+ def constant_time_compare(val1, val2):
+ """
+ Returns True if the two strings are equal, False otherwise.
+
+ The time taken is independent of the number of characters that match.
+ """
+ if len(val1) != len(val2):
+ return False
+ result = 0
+ for x, y in zip(val1, val2):
+ result |= ord(x) ^ ord(y)
+ return result == 0
+
+ # Use the system (hardware-based) random number generator if it exists.
+ if hasattr(random, 'SystemRandom'):
+ randrange = random.SystemRandom().randrange
+ else:
+ randrange = random.randrange
+ _MAX_CSRF_KEY = 18446744073709551616L # 2 << 63
+
+ REASON_NO_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - no Referer."
+ REASON_BAD_REFERER = "Referer checking failed - %s does not match %s."
+ REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE = "CSRF cookie not set."
+ REASON_BAD_TOKEN = "CSRF token missing or incorrect."
+
+ def _get_failure_view():
+ """
+ Returns the view to be used for CSRF rejections
+ """
+ return get_callable(settings.CSRF_FAILURE_VIEW)
+
+ def _get_new_csrf_key():
+ return hashlib.md5("%s%s" % (randrange(0, _MAX_CSRF_KEY), settings.SECRET_KEY)).hexdigest()
+
+ def get_token(request):
+ """
+ Returns the the CSRF token required for a POST form. The token is an
+ alphanumeric value.
+
+ A side effect of calling this function is to make the the csrf_protect
+ decorator and the CsrfViewMiddleware add a CSRF cookie and a 'Vary: Cookie'
+ header to the outgoing response. For this reason, you may need to use this
+ function lazily, as is done by the csrf context processor.
+ """
+ request.META["CSRF_COOKIE_USED"] = True
+ return request.META.get("CSRF_COOKIE", None)
+
+ def _sanitize_token(token):
+ # Allow only alphanum, and ensure we return a 'str' for the sake of the post
+ # processing middleware.
+ token = re.sub('[^a-zA-Z0-9]', '', str(token.decode('ascii', 'ignore')))
+ if token == "":
+ # In case the cookie has been truncated to nothing at some point.
+ return _get_new_csrf_key()
+ else:
+ return token
+
+ class CsrfViewMiddleware(object):
+ """
+ Middleware that requires a present and correct csrfmiddlewaretoken
+ for POST requests that have a CSRF cookie, and sets an outgoing
+ CSRF cookie.
+
+ This middleware should be used in conjunction with the csrf_token template
+ tag.
+ """
+ # The _accept and _reject methods currently only exist for the sake of the
+ # requires_csrf_token decorator.
+ def _accept(self, request):
+ # Avoid checking the request twice by adding a custom attribute to
+ # request. This will be relevant when both decorator and middleware
+ # are used.
+ request.csrf_processing_done = True
+ return None
+
+ def _reject(self, request, reason):
+ return _get_failure_view()(request, reason=reason)
+
+ def process_view(self, request, callback, callback_args, callback_kwargs):
+
+ if getattr(request, 'csrf_processing_done', False):
+ return None
+
+ try:
+ csrf_token = _sanitize_token(request.COOKIES[settings.CSRF_COOKIE_NAME])
+ # Use same token next time
+ request.META['CSRF_COOKIE'] = csrf_token
+ except KeyError:
+ csrf_token = None
+ # Generate token and store it in the request, so it's available to the view.
+ request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] = _get_new_csrf_key()
+
+ # Wait until request.META["CSRF_COOKIE"] has been manipulated before
+ # bailing out, so that get_token still works
+ if getattr(callback, 'csrf_exempt', False):
+ return None
+
+ # Assume that anything not defined as 'safe' by RC2616 needs protection.
+ if request.method not in ('GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS', 'TRACE'):
+ if getattr(request, '_dont_enforce_csrf_checks', False):
+ # Mechanism to turn off CSRF checks for test suite. It comes after
+ # the creation of CSRF cookies, so that everything else continues to
+ # work exactly the same (e.g. cookies are sent etc), but before the
+ # any branches that call reject()
+ return self._accept(request)
+
+ if request.is_secure():
+ # Suppose user visits http://example.com/
+ # An active network attacker,(man-in-the-middle, MITM) sends a
+ # POST form which targets https://example.com/detonate-bomb/ and
+ # submits it via javascript.
+ #
+ # The attacker will need to provide a CSRF cookie and token, but
+ # that is no problem for a MITM and the session independent
+ # nonce we are using. So the MITM can circumvent the CSRF
+ # protection. This is true for any HTTP connection, but anyone
+ # using HTTPS expects better! For this reason, for
+ # https://example.com/ we need additional protection that treats
+ # http://example.com/ as completely untrusted. Under HTTPS,
+ # Barth et al. found that the Referer header is missing for
+ # same-domain requests in only about 0.2% of cases or less, so
+ # we can use strict Referer checking.
+ referer = request.META.get('HTTP_REFERER')
+ if referer is None:
+ logger.warning('Forbidden (%s): %s' % (REASON_NO_REFERER, request.path),
+ extra={
+ 'status_code': 403,
+ 'request': request,
+ }
+ )
+ return self._reject(request, REASON_NO_REFERER)
+
+ # Note that request.get_host() includes the port
+ good_referer = 'https://%s/' % request.get_host()
+ if not same_origin(referer, good_referer):
+ reason = REASON_BAD_REFERER % (referer, good_referer)
+ logger.warning('Forbidden (%s): %s' % (reason, request.path),
+ extra={
+ 'status_code': 403,
+ 'request': request,
+ }
+ )
+ return self._reject(request, reason)
+
+ if csrf_token is None:
+ # No CSRF cookie. For POST requests, we insist on a CSRF cookie,
+ # and in this way we can avoid all CSRF attacks, including login
+ # CSRF.
+ logger.warning('Forbidden (%s): %s' % (REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE, request.path),
+ extra={
+ 'status_code': 403,
+ 'request': request,
+ }
+ )
+ return self._reject(request, REASON_NO_CSRF_COOKIE)
+
+ # check non-cookie token for match
+ request_csrf_token = ""
+ if request.method == "POST":
+ request_csrf_token = request.POST.get('csrfmiddlewaretoken', '')
+
+ if request_csrf_token == "":
+ # Fall back to X-CSRFToken, to make things easier for AJAX,
+ # and possible for PUT/DELETE
+ request_csrf_token = request.META.get('HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN', '')
+
+ if not constant_time_compare(request_csrf_token, csrf_token):
+ logger.warning('Forbidden (%s): %s' % (REASON_BAD_TOKEN, request.path),
+ extra={
+ 'status_code': 403,
+ 'request': request,
+ }
+ )
+ return self._reject(request, REASON_BAD_TOKEN)
+
+ return self._accept(request)
+
+# timezone support is new in Django 1.4
+try:
+ from django.utils import timezone
+except ImportError:
+ timezone = None
+
+# dateparse is ALSO new in Django 1.4
+try:
+ from django.utils.dateparse import parse_date, parse_datetime
+except ImportError:
+ import datetime
+ import re
+
+ date_re = re.compile(
+ r'(?P<year>\d{4})-(?P<month>\d{1,2})-(?P<day>\d{1,2})$'
+ )
+
+ datetime_re = re.compile(
+ r'(?P<year>\d{4})-(?P<month>\d{1,2})-(?P<day>\d{1,2})'
+ r'[T ](?P<hour>\d{1,2}):(?P<minute>\d{1,2})'
+ r'(?::(?P<second>\d{1,2})(?:\.(?P<microsecond>\d{1,6})\d{0,6})?)?'
+ r'(?P<tzinfo>Z|[+-]\d{1,2}:\d{1,2})?$'
+ )
+
+ time_re = re.compile(
+ r'(?P<hour>\d{1,2}):(?P<minute>\d{1,2})'
+ r'(?::(?P<second>\d{1,2})(?:\.(?P<microsecond>\d{1,6})\d{0,6})?)?'
+ )
+
+ def parse_date(value):
+ match = date_re.match(value)
+ if match:
+ kw = dict((k, int(v)) for k, v in match.groupdict().iteritems())
+ return datetime.date(**kw)
+
+ def parse_time(value):
+ match = time_re.match(value)
+ if match:
+ kw = match.groupdict()
+ if kw['microsecond']:
+ kw['microsecond'] = kw['microsecond'].ljust(6, '0')
+ kw = dict((k, int(v)) for k, v in kw.iteritems() if v is not None)
+ return datetime.time(**kw)
+
+ def parse_datetime(value):
+ """Parse datetime, but w/o the timezone awareness in 1.4"""
+ match = datetime_re.match(value)
+ if match:
+ kw = match.groupdict()
+ if kw['microsecond']:
+ kw['microsecond'] = kw['microsecond'].ljust(6, '0')
+ kw = dict((k, int(v)) for k, v in kw.iteritems() if v is not None)
+ return datetime.datetime(**kw)
+
+# Markdown is optional
+try:
+ import markdown
+
+ def apply_markdown(text):
+ """
+ Simple wrapper around :func:`markdown.markdown` to set the base level
+ of '#' style headers to <h2>.
+ """
+
+ extensions = ['headerid(level=2)']
+ safe_mode = False,
+ md = markdown.Markdown(extensions=extensions, safe_mode=safe_mode)
+ return md.convert(text)
+
+except ImportError:
+ apply_markdown = None
+
+
+# Yaml is optional
+try:
+ import yaml
+except ImportError:
+ yaml = None
+
+
+import unittest
+try:
+ import unittest.skip
+except ImportError: # python < 2.7
+ from unittest import TestCase
+ import functools
+
+ def skip(reason):
+ # Pasted from py27/lib/unittest/case.py
+ """
+ Unconditionally skip a test.
+ """
+ def decorator(test_item):
+ if not (isinstance(test_item, type) and issubclass(test_item, TestCase)):
+ @functools.wraps(test_item)
+ def skip_wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
+ pass
+ test_item = skip_wrapper
+
+ test_item.__unittest_skip__ = True
+ test_item.__unittest_skip_why__ = reason
+ return test_item
+ return decorator
+
+ unittest.skip = skip
+
+
+# xml.etree.parse only throws ParseError for python >= 2.7
+try:
+ from xml.etree import ParseError as ETParseError
+except ImportError: # python < 2.7
+ ETParseError = None